Abstract. In this paper we focus on the current status of German employer-sponsored supplementary pensions in the context of moves towards the harmonization of international accounting standards. We emphasize the changing standards used to measure pension liability, and the consequences of these changes for (firstly) corporate management discretion and (secondly) German under-funded systems of defined benefit pensions. In combination, we show that claimed historical differences between the Anglo-American market for corporate control and the German system of entrenched management within interlocking boards of supervision are now less compelling than assumed. Adoption of international and US financial accounting standards by leading German corporations presages a new era in European capital markets with important implications for the design and management of German supplementary pensions. The reader is introduced to financial accounting standards institutions, the evolution of US accounting standards since the introduction of FASB 87 and recent patterns in US corporate pensions and liabilities. Emphasis is placed upon the concerted campaign of national and international accounting professionals to harmonise corporate accounting practices and the measurement of pension liabilities to accepted international standards. Using data collected from 1998 annual reports for German finns in the DAX 30 index, we report on the adoption of international accounting standards and the scope and significance of reported corporate net pension liabilities. Noting the theoretical literature relevant to adoption, we identify four reasons that may account for the immediate adoption of intemational accounting standards. As well, tests for correlation between net pension liabilities and indicators of corporate financial performance are developed. In conclusion, implications are drawn for management discretion and the future of German defined benefit pension systems.
Introduction
The united Germany is at the economic core of continental Europe, and is one of a handful of advanced western economies with firms that have global reach and impact.
By virtue of its market size, its prosperity, and its trading relationships with Europe and the world, Germany has become a major economic player if not a dominant political player in world affairs. For many commentators, the German "social market" model is one to emulate, being a successful economic system with strong social democratic traditions (compared to the UK; see Hutton 1995) . Described as the ideal-type of a corporatist welfare state by Goodin et al. (1999) , it is widely believed that Germany developed around reinforcing self-sustaining systems of social welfare and collective economic decision-making that have resulted in political stability and remarkable rates of long-term economic growth.
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Like France and Italy, however, Germany will be greatly affected by the "demographic bomb": the relative ageing of population combined with the underfunding of social security and related retirement benefits (see Disney 2000) . It is clear that current contribution rates are inadequate in the face of the immediate effects of early retirements and continuing levels of unemployment, and promised high rates of income replacement over the long-term. While there is considerable pride in Bismarck's model of social solidarity and insurance (Borsch-Supan 2000) , there is widespread debate about the form and nature of private pension provision.
2 Even so, debate is often limited about employer-sponsored pensions, an important element in many German workers' total compensation. Some of Germany's largest firms have provided these types of benefits for more than a century. Many of these same firms have had extensive experience with Anglo-American funded pension schemes including defined contribution and cash-balance systems. Whereas much of the public debate about private pensions has been about protecting the status social insurance, for Germany's largest firms there is considerable interest in the redesign of existing supplementary pension systems including shifting away from direktzusagen (book reserve) systems that were so important for internal investment resources.
This interest has been prompted, in part, by recent developments in global capital markets and international financial accounting rules. Here it is argued that these developments may have significant implications for German corporatesponsored pensions, profoundly affecting the viability of direktzusagen and pensionskassen (mutual insurance) defined benefit systems. Whereas very little was known even five years ago about the pension liabilities of German firms, the introduction of international accounting standards to German corporate reporting has allowed market agents to better appreciate the scope and scale of these liabilities compared to Anglo-American corporate rivals. For many of Germany's largest firms, these private pension institutions are now "in play" as part of a more general realignment of powers between management, labour and shareholders. How and why financial transparency and comparability has become so significant, and the implications of such accountability for management power (in the first instance) and private pension systems (in the second instance) are important topics of this paper.
To sustain our analysis requires returning to an earlier debate in the US about the connection between market value and corporate pension liabilities (see Bodie and Shoven 1983) . While the debate was truncated by introduction of the Financial Accounting Standards Board pension liability rule (FASB 87) and the remarkable performance of US equity markets over the 1990s, recent trends in US corporate pension funding and reporting are noted. In later sections of the paper we deal with the convergence of US, international and European accounting standards, noting the underlying assumptions made by accounting professionals about the efficiency of global financial markets. Notice, however, that our discussion stops short of the announced re-formation of the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) in May 2000, and subsequent developments in the European Commission (June 2000) . In detail, we consider the (1998) patterns of German corporate pension accounting in DAX 30 index and non-DAX 30 companies. Given that German corporate pension systems are "unfunded" ( direktzusagen) or "under-funded"
(pensionskassen) when compared to Anglo-American private pension systems (Clark 2001) , the adoption of international accounting standards has revealed significant net pension liabilities amongst leading German corporations. 3 This discussion is a step towards analysing corporate pension investment policy in the context of codetermination (the subject of a related paper).
We should note that this paper and related research sits between the disciplines of political economy and economic geography (Clark 2000) . There is a massive and growing academic literature devoted to rival national systems of finance and corporate governance (Hopt et al. 1999) . Similarly, there has been an explosion of work on the tensions between globalisation and localisation (Gertler 2000) . Both sets of literature combine, in different ways, the analysis of institutions, rules and regulations with reasons for and against the convergence of systems of corporate governance and management (see Christopherson 1993 and compare with Weiner 1999) . In this paper, we argue that global financial integration and the international convergence of accounting rules and regulations have overtaken the inherited domestic institutions of German employer-sponsored pensions. For large DAX 30 firms, the adoption of international accounting frameworks will have far-reaching implications for the future of German supplementary pension systems. Whereas much of the literature on national financial systems presupposes the persistence of difference between competing financial regimes, we argue that any presumption in favour of persistent difference must be balanced against the interests of some private agents (corporate and market) in convergence.
Pension Liability and Corporate Finance
Much of the literature comparing Anglo-American and German systems of finance and corporate governance accentuate the differences, not the historical links or the overlapping, perhaps converging, institutions. While there are good reasons to do so, recognising remarkable differences of economic performance in German and AngloAmerican financial markets over the 1990s, we should not exaggerate the historical record. 4 In particular, we believe that any understanding of current pension funding dilemmas faced by German corporations should begin with an brief look backwards to the introduction of the US Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 and the subsequent debate about pension liability accounting and funding. In looking at the US historical record, we can draw together informed glimpses of issues and circumstances relevant to the contemporary situation in Germany.
Prior to the passage of ERISA, the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) was the dominant governmental institution responsible for over-seeing the financial integrity of private employer-sponsored pension plans. Using powers conferred by their role in certifying the federal tax status of these plans, the IRS monitored the funding of corporate pension liabilities. While the IRS encouraged the funding of pension liabilities, according to informed observers the IRS tended to encourage funding according to minimum standards rather than the full-funding of liabilities (Murray 1976, 152) . Also involved in "regulating" corporate pension plans was the Accounting Principles Board (APB), a forerunner to the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). 5 This private association of accounting professionals used advisory opinions to set voluntary accounting standards, particularly in the area of reporting corporate profit and loss statements. Neither the IRS nor the APB directly regulated corporate pension funding practices; firms had wide discretion in setting expected interest rates, rates of return on invested assets, the timing of contributions, and the accounting of unexpected gains and losses (Weiss 1976) .
The passage of ERISA in 1974 saw the introduction of statutory provisions designed to protect workers' pension rights and mechanisms designed to ensure that all workers were able to vest and participate in offered pension plans. In effect, the federal government introduced concepts allied with civil rights legislation to pension law so as to ensure equitable and fair treatment (see Clark 1993 and Sass 1997) . As well, ERISA set conditions for the full funding of defined benefit plans' expected liabilities spread over an extended period of time while requiring earlier recognition by plans (and hence plans) of gains or shortfalls in investment performance. In effect, ERISA sought to redefine the financial discretion available to plan sponsors and set stricter parameters for pension funding. The move towards the full funding of liabilities in accordance with commonly accepted standards was under-scored by the creation of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). It was designated as the federal agency responsible for protecting the value of accrued pension benefits (albeit at a discount), a responsibility shared between the Department of Labor (DoL), the IRS and the federal courts (Clark 1993 ).
The available evidence at the time suggested that many pension plans were funded in a manner consistent with ERISA standards. Even though passage of ERISA can be traced back, in part, to widely publicised instances of corporate bankruptcy and the total loss of accrued benefits, pension plan funding was a well-established technical craft sustained by principles drawn from trust law and related common law standards of behaviour (Langbein 1997 with a limited transition period. As was the case in FASB 87, the guiding principle behind FASB 106 was full disclosure using consistent and comparable standards of valuation and reporting. Given that many of the firms sponsoring defined benefit plans also provided related but largely unfunded health care benefits, it was anticipated that FASB 106 would have significant effects on their reported profit and loss statements . The available evidence at the time suggested that the market under-estimated the true costs of such benefits, reflected in market prices higher than expected . In subsequent sections, we look in more detail at the flow-on of these accounting standards to other jurisdictions. In doing so, our historical record closes just before (Mitchell 1999) , the market valuation of health care and retirement benefits have effectively made such benefits part and parcel of the valuation of traded companies and hence the market for corporate control (Siegel 1996) . In effect, defined contribution plans shift costs and financial risks to plan participants away from firm stockholders and management. Early fears tha t FASB 87 would result in corporate bankruptcies and the collapse of the PBGC proved unfounded. Notwithstanding the problems of financing corporate restructuring and the funding of defined pension benefits in the automobile and steel industries, the PBGC emerged unscathed in the early 1990s. The economic success of the first Clinton administration combined with the accelerated growth in US equity markets from the early to late 1990s effectively discounted the value of inherited defined benefit liabilities. By virtue of the extended period of transition allowed by FASB, and a compromise on reporting year-to-year unexpected gains and losses on pension fund assets, the transition occurred in an era of economic growth.
Patterns of US Corporate Pension Liabilities
More recently, with the run-up in Anglo-American market beginning around 1993-1994 rates of return on invested assets out-stripped conventional expectations. By year-end 1999, annualised US equity returns were more than 12 percent in real terms as many pension funds shifted assets towards equities and away from fixed income products (Clark 2000) .
To better appreciate the nature and significance of US corporate pension obligations, we turn now to the results of a report published by Bear Stearns (McConnell et al. 1999 According to McConnell et al. (1999, p. 10) , the reported reduction in net pension expenditure for many firms and the shift to net pension income for a minority of firms reflected, in part, change in the assumed expected return on pension fund assets. Also suggested was the possibility that some firms had benefited from the "amortization of actual returns in excess of expected returns." The expected return on assets is a positive function of the equity-bias in pension fund investment strategies.
Because FASB 87 requires defined benefit plan sponsors to look forward when reporting pension assets and liabilities, there is a temptation for pension fund investment officers to follow markets upwards, thereby reducing the year-to-year financial burden on plan sponsors. In this instance, the average expected rate of return increased from 9.08 percent in 1994 to 9.19 percent in 1998. 8 Even so, some 50 or more firms reported no change in expected returns over the period 1991 to 1998
and only a handful of firms reported a yearly revision in their expected returns over the period 1993 to 1998. Furthermore, there were no apparent patterns between firms' expected return policies and the extent of under-or over-funding in relation to expected long-term obligations. This finding is consistent with Lowenstein's (1996) While it is impossible to determine the extent to which FASB accounting measures of defined benefit pension liabilities have contributed to the growth of employersponsored defined contribution plans, market analysts have become highly-tuned to the potential risks associated with defined benefit plans. There can be little doubt that transparency has prompted the discounting of existing and potential financial risks associated with sponsored pension plans.
Evolution of Global Accounting Standards
By this account, FASB has become an essential cog in the web of regulatory institutions that over-see US corporate governance and the market for corporate control. Its professional associations and independent appointment system buttress its mandate as an independent expert authority on accounting practice. FASB has many of the attributes and functions identified by Power (1998) as a private institution of social governance (as opposed to government). It is a self-organising institution that relies upon decentralised management mechanisms like self-measurement and selfreporting to sustain corporate compliance with codes of practice for the benefit of third party market agents. In this case, of course, FASB operates in a regulatory space in part provided by the SEC. It functions in the light caste by the SEC as well as its professional membership not just in the shadows caste by government regulation in general (compare with Power 1998, p. 9) . In this sense, it is less an institution of trust than it is a non-profit institution with legitimate coercive powers of discipline. In this regard, regulation of the global financial services industry is increasingly at the center of debate over nation-state autonomy. For example, Rhodes and Apeldoorn (1998, 423) noted that the European and global harmonization of accounting rules and regulation is an especially contested sphere of public policy. standards were judged more exacting in some cases (multi-employer plans, unanticipated extra costs, and anticipated changes in government regulations) and "different" in other cases (especially the treatment of defined contribution plans).
One slight difference was that IAS 19 does not require corporations to report their minimum defined benefit liability whereas FAS 87 does. Apart from this issue, Petrone suggested that market agents would readily understand any other differences.
For some academic analysts the IASC is an extension of FASB being, by extension, the agent of the SEC which itself represents US nation-state interests in extending the geographical reach of US capital markets. 15 According to this view, and in defence of other types of national financial systems, due respect must be accorded to "local" interests in the design and adoption of accounting rules. While not disputing the need for nation-states to accommodate (in some fashion) to international financial standards, by this account geopolitics combined with market agents and interests "explain" the convergence of accounting rules and standards. In this paper, however, neither the SEC nor the US government is the deus ex machina of our argument-all-powerful agents driving accounting professionals towards the harmonization of global accounting standards. This kind of argument ignores important differences between institutions, it ignores the independent processes of consultation and advice used by the IASC, and it ignores the competition for agenda setting amongst national and international accounting standards institutions. Further more, this conspiracy view skates over apparent tensions within and between national institutions and their constituent members. Witness, for instance, the political difficulties encountered by FASB in the early to mid 1990s when it tried to introduce an accounting standard to fully account for the cost of stock-based employee compensation plans. So significant was industry and congressional opposition to the proposed standard that the very future of FASB was under threat until a compromise was reached. Similarly, the SEC has allowed foreign firms to list on US financial markets even if this has meant accepting accounting standards at some variance to US GAAP. 17 In response, the UK ASB proposed a new rule on pension liability stronger than either FASB 87 or IAS 19. 18 In the second instance, it should also be recognised that there is, more often than not, an idealised "client" behind the SEC, FASB, ASB, IOSCO and the IASC:
capital market agents whose role it is to properly price the value of traded securities.
And behind those agents are the normative goals of these institutions: the enhancement of the efficiency and fairness of global financial markets (Steinberg et al. 1999) . By this logic, the enemies of market agents and market efficiency are firms and governments reluctant to disclose important financial information, and firms willing to manipulate the information so disclosed. But notice an implication hidden in these claims: information about corporate financial performance is a public good rather than a private matter that is the object of privileged access. Of course, information is not quite the same as reasoned knowledge; there is a vibrant market in 
German Corporate Accounting Standards
The completion of the IASC code and its related employee benefit accounting standards has been accompanied by strong pressure from the SEC and FASB to create credible audit systems for monitoring compliance and credible sanctions for noncompliance. Partly in response, the IASC has proposed a plan designed to re-make the Committee, utilising a Board with a membership structure and set of powers capable of implementing the new international code. 19 At the same time, a number of advanced economies have moved to replace their own codes with the IASC code or, as in the German case, create accounting boards to deal with and/or implement international standards. In effect, IASC code has become the reference point for many countries wishing to adopt accounting standards consistent with, if not exactly the same as, international standards and expectations regarding the proper regulation of global financial markets and corporate governance.
Adoption of international accounting standards
German legislation (1998) allowing domiciled firms to use international accounting standards is indicative of the force behind global harmonization. But this legislation simply allowed rather than required the use of international accounting standards.
Furthermore, as we have seen above, much of the theoretical literature on corporate disclosure and finance presumes firms are reluctant to disclose and will only report that information required by law (see Admati and Pfleiderer 1998 and Fishman and Hagerty 1997) . Not only are there considerable costs associated with producing this kind of information, there is also some anxiety at the corporate level about the consequences of disclosure for firms' market positions. These anxieties were put into sharp relief by the extraordinary result that accompanied Daimler-Benz's adoption of US GAAP standards in 1993. As is well-known, and repeatedly discussed amongst market analysts, year-end earnings disclosure using these standards converted a
German accounting standards' "profit" into a US GAAP "loss." These kinds of "surprises" can have enormous implications for how global financial markets value individual and groups of related firms.
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There are also academic theorists who, in any event, would argue against convergence in national systems of corporate governance. Invoking notions of path dependence and sunk costs consistent with economic geography (Clark et al. 2000) , Bebchuk and Roe (1998) made the theoretical case for "continued divergence" rather than "convergence" in national systems of corporate governance (over 15 to 20 years). In doing so, they argued against simple-minded presumptions in favour of market solutions to conflicting national regulatory regimes. Even so they recognised that convergence was possible, depending upon the balance of forces between "competitive globalisation" and "path dependence". But they also suggested this was an empirical question, to be resolved by history not by the inexorable logic of economic theory (see also Berndt 1998a (Table 1) . 22 Note that we ignored, for the moment, subsequent mergers and acquisitions that have affected the structure of the DAX 30. The DAX 30 index firms dominate total market capitalization. Their share of the market far out-strips the Dow Jones index share of total US market capitalization. At the same time, German publicly traded firms are less significant in relation to the stock of all traded and non-traded firms compared to US and UK markets. As for the sample of 36 smaller firms, many were very small indeed with less than DM100 million in reported assets. As should be appreciated, it is much harder to collect information on these firms.
Given expectations noted above, the patterns apparent in Table 2 may come as a surprise. Basically, the majority of DAX-listed firms immediately adopted international accounting standards (IAS and/or FASB) when permitted to do so.
Indeed subsequent to publication of the 1998 annual reports most other DAX 30 index companies including Volkswagen and Siemens have indicated that they also will adopt these standards in the near future. 23 By contrast, only 3 of the 36 firms outside of the DAX 30 have switched to international standards (Appendix 1). Thus we can reject hypotheses (1) and (2) outright. But this leaves us the task of explaining the rate of adoption amongst DAX 30 as opposed to non-DAX 30 firms.
Explaining patterns of adoption
Adoption is rarely studied in the Anglo-American literature because of the mandatory nature of accounting standards. 24 Explanations of adoption that would invoke firm size, industry affiliation, and export orientation are not convincing (compare Glaum et al. 1998) . Each sector like automobiles, chemicals and engineering has exceptions making comparison between industrials and retail-commercial sectors (for example) less than compelling. Thus we leave aside the option of an econometric modelling strategy and concentrate on four propositions that may "explain" early adoption within the DAX 30 index environment.
Being included in the DAX 30 signifies a distinctive status with respect to competition between international financial markets, therein requiring reporting
systems consistent with the standards of those markets. This argument has two parts.
Firstly, we should recognize that demand for country-specific index-based passive equity investment products grew dramatically over the 1990s. The realization that the costs of active investment, more often than not, out-weigh the returns from stock selection in the soaring markets of the late 1990s prompted investment strategies that discounted firm-specific information in favor of indicative bundles of stocks.
Secondly On balance, and with respect to those firms included in the DAX 30 index, the forces of competitive globalization seemed to out-weigh path dependence (compare Bebchuk and Roe 1998). Slowly emerging is a form of German corporate capitalism perhaps more consistent with that described by Berle and Means (1933) for the US than that associated with traditional German industry organisation (Berndt 1998b ).
Thus, even hypothesis 3 noted above should be rejected, at least for those large German firms included in the DAX 30 index.
German corporate pension liabilities
This, then, brings us to the pattern of net corporate pension liabilities reported in To better appreciate the underlying patterns of pension liability, we set total net pension liability against three variables: total reported employment, total reported liabilities, and total reported gross revenue (Figure 1 ). This is rarely done, if ever, for Clearly pension policy, and pension liability management varies a great deal within DAX 30 index firms. To make more sense of these patterns requires greater knowledge of the circumstances of individual firms (compare Berndt 1998b) . In general, we have shown that DAX 30 index firms are closely integrated with the evolving international accounting standards regime. We have also shown that reported pension liabilities amongst these firms are very significant. And for those firms not reporting liabilities, the inherited German accounting standards regime can not be considered a refuge from global finance. Whether adoption of these standards will affect corporate governance (hypothesis 4), however remains unclear.
Management Discretion and Retirement Plans
There are a variety of implications to be drawn from this discussion for German corporate structure (in general) and the future of German corporate-sponsored supplementary pensions (in particular). To assess hypothesis 4, let us begin by making three entirely obvious comments about the goals behind international accounting standards. One goal has been to displace the interests of insiders for the interests of outsiders. This means displacing those with special access to pricesensitive information in favor of market agents and shareholders without privileged channels of access. Another goal has been to regulate managers, not just by imposing rules and regulations on their behavior but also by imposing rules and regulations on the disclosure of information about the performance of their firms. Yet another goal has been to improve the economic efficiency of resource allocation between firms and between sectors. According to FASB and the IASC, access to capital is a better economic process if it is a disembodied process of market supply and demand. For
German firms traditionally biased in favour of insiders, reliant upon overlapping and reinforcing supervisory boards, and the beneficiaries of non-traded preferential financial terms and conditions, harmonization to IASC rules presages a very different world of markets and competition for financial resources.
The introduction of international accounting standards will alter managers' discretion, will change their available options, and will impose constraints on the use of inherited modes of financial decision-making. This will not, however, mean the end of managers' discretion. Concerns, noted above, about earnings management within the existing US GAAP regime is evidence enough about the remaining scope for action (and subversion). Moreover, the new regime of market intermediation may actually strengthen German corporate management in relation to claims for special status made by other stakeholders. We suggest here that the introduction of IASC accounting standards may actually drive a wedge between the interests of corporate management, the interests of their supervisory boards, and the process of (labormanagement) co-determination. To illustrate, consider the implications of these observations for German employer-sponsored supplementary pensions given the under-funding of direktzusagen and pensionskassen pension systems.
By default, IAS 19 and its variants blur historical distinctions between the various ways German firms finance retirement income. Recall that the direktzusagen pension system is a means of re-cycling employer pension contributions as selfmanaged self-investment funds. Assuming success, corporate long-term retirement obligations are to be paid out of the resulting proceeds of long term growth (measured by revenue flow and higher labor productivity). Many theorists of comparative corporate governance believe that the direktzusagen system under-wrote post-1945
German economic growth. Further more, the existence of these systems of internal finance are often invoked to account for the distinctive capital-rich profiles of German industrial firms compared to their Anglo-American competitors (Hopt et al. 1998 ).
However, international accounting standards are neither required to be sensitive to the national economic significance of this institution, nor are they necessarily sensitive to the implied social contract between successive generations of company workers.
Annual net pension cost, the IASC prospective corporate balance sheet entry, stands instead of the various social mechanisms of funding long-term corporate pension liability.
International accounting standards will likely re-write long-term pension liabilities, not counted against current income in German accounting practices, as short-term liabilities. Thus the under-funding of long-term pension obligations, characteristic of direktzusagen systems and common to corporate pensionskassen funds, will be charged against the current value of the firm. Given the extent of net pension liabilities in many leading German industrial firms (Table 2 and Figure 1) , it is possible that these liabilities could translate into lower corporate quoted market prices relative to similar Anglo-American firms operating from IASC and FASB compliant jurisdictions. Even if firms were to remain loyal to German accounting standards, market agents will likely draw implications about their underlying pension liabilities using the information available on German firms that report according to international standards. A low relative market price accompanied by modern capital assets and advantageous market positions are, as well, opportunities for rival firms to mount hostile take-over offers. In effect, German corporate supplementary pensions may become implicated in the pan-European market for corporate control. This would re-play the recent history of US employer-sponsored pensions, including the interaction between pension liabilities and corporate restructuring (Clark 1993) .
Importantly, the discounting of corporate value may also be accompanied by the introduction of external benchmarks for judging investment returns. In the absence of deep German and European equity markets, for many years the benchmark for internal investment was long-term government bonds. As well, given the quantitative regulation of asset allocations in favor of bonds and against equities, long-term bonds were the favored investment class for pensionskassen funds. But as the integration of European financial markets has accelerated over the past five years, bond rates have converged and yields have declined relative to the performance of global equity markets. In the context of the development of pan-European sectorbased equity portfolios by institutional investors, it has become difficult to justify a benchmark rate of return set to bond rates. Even so, the adoption of equity related benchmarks would be quite problematic. There are few obvious ways of increasing the internal rate of return (and reducing the opportunity cost of capital) without Thus, the disclosure of under-funded pension liabilities is a threat to, and an opportunity to re-make, managers' discretion in relation to historical privileges. Not surprisingly, there has been a significant shift over the past ten years amongst large German firms away from direktzusagen systems. Another response has been to slowly increase funding of pensionskassen obligations thereby reducing overall reported corporate pension liability. These trends imply, of course, significant shortterm financial costs for corporate stakeholders in the form of lower profits, rates of return, and lower real wages. And there are conflicting interests embedded in German firms that make this strategy more problematic than often supposed. Whereas to closeout current defined benefit pension schemes and replace them with defined contribution schemes. By doing so, the risks and liabilities associated DB plans would be transferred to employees, thereby removing those items entirely from corporate accounting. Here, the full consequences of FASB 87 for US corporate pension funding would be incorporated into the German arena. This would not remove the necessity of funding current obligations. There would remain significant financial burdens to be resolved and distributed over time. And there would be powerful political forces to be over-come if such a re-allocation of risk were to be accepted by German workers. But it is an option advocated by a number of German banks and the Anglo-American investment management industry. Indeed, the debate about EU pension regulation is thoroughly permeated by the tensions engendered by German pension liabilities.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have traced the evolution of US corporate accounting practices from APB Opinions through to the current SEC and FASB co-sponsored regime of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). The focus of argument and discussion was the treatment of pension liabilities, and inevitably those liabilities associated with defined benefit or final salary pension schemes. Drawing upon debate around the time FASB 87 and 106 were introduced, we demonstrated that issues raised then (over twenty years ago) are highly relevant to the German scene. In fact, recent evidence drawn from German corporate annual reports suggests that many of the largest DAX 30 index firms have rapidly embraced these standards, notwithstanding the apparent implications for pension funding from such adoption.
As FASB, the IASC and the ASB have converged upon a harmonized set of accounting standards that promote transparency, consistency and comparability, financial and corporate governance systems outside of these standards have had to adapt to, if not always adopt, these standards.
In doing so, we assessed the evolution of core systems of financial accounting in the Anglo-American world against changes at the margins of German financial and corporate practice. That is, our argument took the historical evolution of US accounting standards over a period of about 40 years and set the results of that history against German institutions in the context of EU integration over the past five years or so. There are clearly significant conceptual and empirical dangers inherent in such a strategy. Whereas history was assumed to slowly unfold in one context (the US), we have argued that history is currently under threat in another context (Germany). In one, path dependence is the motive force of history, in the other lock-in is almost immediately resolved by the forces of global finance and economic logic. This may well be the case, empirically speaking. Remarkably, the largest German firms have proved far more responsive than theory would suggest. But it does not do justice to the coherence and persistence of German institutions and traditions; we also need to look more closely at the ways in which such threats are accommodated within these institutions rather than accepting the proclaimed "end of history". This is the subject of a related forthcoming paper. It looks at the ways in which nation-specific social expectations and co-determination interact with German corporate investment practice.
Still, notwithstanding these reasonable doubts about the force of our argument, it should be noted that the process of harmonization to international accounting standards is quite unlike many other multilateral negotiations over trade etc. Whereas we have come to expect that nation-states are the active agents behind such negotiations, balancing internal social and economic interests against the interests of global trading partners, in corporate finance independent accounting professionals have become the negotiators and standard setters. As recent debate about the restructuring of the IASC has shown, the idea that accounting professionals ought to "represent" or in some way "balance" their underlying "national interests" with the professional harmonization of global accounting standards has been soundly rejected.
The IASC has eschewed "representative nationalism" in favour of the interests of their idealised clients in global capital markets. This has been a difficult lesson for the SEC, a bastion of financial nationalism, and has only been slowly accepted by the ASB. On the other hand, for many smaller advanced economies, it is an ideal readily accepted and incorporated into national regulations.
Whatever the interests of nation-states, the international accounting profession has moved far faster and far more comprehensively than many believed possible.
They have done so in the context of the interests of private market agents, thereby sustaining the globalization of markets for financial services. In these ways, the Here, though, doubts are raised about the effects of such differences on nations' relative economic performance. See also Carlin and Mayer (1999) who dispute the generality of any connection between financial structure and economic performance. Berndt (1998a Berndt ( , 1998b also assesses the robustness of the German model, weaving together sectoral and firm-based studies with geographical differentiation. He is less sanguine about the persistence of the 12 /. There is considerable doubt about the long-term viability of such an EU regulatory strategy. In a study comparing US and EU business law about a decade ago, Conard (1991) suggested that a model of EU regulation based upon "federal" minimum standards and nationstate discretion could easily degenerate into inter-jurisdictional rivalry. He wondered how it would be possible to stop some jurisdictions adopting so-called "lax" standards within the "federal" umbrella, thereby initiating a "race of laxity" amongst EU nation-states. More recently, Swaine (2000) has noted that member states lack a firmly entrenched constitutional principle of subsidiarity that could protect them from liability when discriminating between private actors like corporations on the basis of their national origin. 26 /. Whether corporate annual reports used IAS 19 or US GAAP, liability data include adjustments for the "fair value" of pension assets, the present value of accumulated and expected defined benefit obligations, and the "experience" of managing investment assets.
The integrity of the data is difficult to determine; only year-to-year comparison over a reasonable time horizon can really make sense of individual corporate reports. 
